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EXTRATERRESTRIAL PERSONS
Wim B. Drees
1. Introduction
The question I want to discuss in this paper is: on what condition
would we apply our concepts of person to extraterrestrials? This question
is concerned with an investigation into the way we employ our concepts
rather than with an investigation of extraterrestrials.
The applicability of the criteria presented by H.G. Hubbeling in this
volume will be discussed, together with a few other philosophical
contributions concerned with the concept of person, both in general (JJ.
Oosten in this volume) and in relation to extraterrestials (M. Tooley, R.
Puccetti).
I agree with R. Planck (1968) and L.W. Beck (1971) that claims about
contacts between humans and extraterrestrials are at present matter for
psychological research. However, the mere possibility of the existence of
life and intelligence elsewhere in the universe should be taken seriously.
And it is taken seriously by the International Astronomical Union, which
in 1982 established a Committee on the Search for Extraterrestrial Life.
Evidence of the actual existence of such life has not yet been found,
but the absence of evidence in this field is not evidence of absence.
2. Would ETIs be persons?
The philosophical question within the context of this volume is
whether a concept of person can be applied to ETIs (Extraterrestrial
Intelligences). The answer depends on the concept of person used.
2.1 Individuality, self-consciousness and will as criteria.
If one uses the classical definition of Boethius, discussed by Hubbeling in
this volume, 'personae est naturae rationalis individua substantia', one has
to concern oneself with two components: rationality and individuality.
Rationality might be ascribed to extraterrestrial beings on the basis
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of the signals received. Signals should neither be too regular nor too
chaotic because such signals would be ascribed to ordinary physical
processes. For some kind of radio signal to be able to serve as evidence
for the presence of extraterrestrial intelligence, it would be best if it
could be interpreted meaningfully, say, as an expression of the prime
numbers or chemical elements. Such a message need not be evidence of a
living being, since there are many messages which can be produced by
machines (chess computers, etc.). In any case, messages come from ETIs,
or from machines produced by ETIs, or from machines which could
themselves be considered intelligent.
Whereas the ascription of rationality, understood as intelligence,
might be defended on the basis of conceivable evidence in the form of
radio signals containing information of a certain structure, individuality
is more problematic. On Earth, projects like interstellar communication
require organizations composed of many individuals. In bilateral com-
munication the time between question and answer would exceed many
earthly generations. But elsewhere there might, of course, be a different
life span, and biological individuality need not be the same as it is on
Earth. Life might be more symbiotic, as it is in the case of termites. As
long as the information content of the messages has not been deciphered,
nothing meaningful can be said about the structure of individuality of the
transmitting being(s).
Hubbeling characterizes 'person' as possessing self-consciousness and
will, bearing moral and aesthetic values, as well as having an 'I-Thou'
relation to other individuals, to the collective 'thou' of the group, and to
God.
As far as self-consciousness and will are concerned I can be brief.
Sending messages into outer space implies that the transmitting civiliza-
tion considers it possible that somewhere in the universe there might be
other civilizations. This implies a certain degree of reflection upon their
own civilization, and hence something like self-consciousness. Since
communication does not come about by chance, one being, or more, must
have decided to send messages, signals with contents. Consequently, if
'will' is taken as the criterion of personhood, the existence of messages
points to the existence of persons.
The existence of messages does not give any information about the
question whether ETIs have aesthetic values. The contents of the
messages, however, could have aesthetic value, e.g., a representation of
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the music of J.S. Bach.
2.2 ETIs and morality
Moral criteria for personhood can much less clearly be applied to
ETIs. However, there have been some discussions on this issue.
M. Tooley has discussed the question 'Would ETIs Be Persons?' in
relation to the question of 'how we ought to interact with extrater-
restrial, non hu n i a n intelligences' (Tooley: 1976, 129). Tooley has based
himself on the distinction between three classes, namely inanimate
objects, animals and adult human beings (persons). To which class would
ETIs belong? According to Tooley,
to be a person an extraterrestrial being would have to be a conscious entity
with the capacity for self-consciousness plus the capacity for envisaging a
future for itself and for having desires about its continued existence (Tooley:
1976,141).
The epistemological question arises as to how one could know whether an
ΕΤΙ possesses these properties.
The answer depends, according to Tooley, on one's philosophy of
mind. Behaviourists (mind is a matter of there being a certain type of
complex behaviour) would not have any difficulty with this question, nor
would it pose serious problems to identity theorists (mental states are
states of the nervous system). The issue would in fact only be problema-
tic for dualists (mind is something non-physical and private). However,
dualists give different accounts of the conviction that other human minds
exist (analogy, explanatory power, use of terms referring to mental
states), and these accounts can also be applied to ETIs. Tooley concludes
that there are conditions which would justify anybody in believing that
certain ETIs possess self-consciousness, and are capable of envisaging a
future and having desires about their own continued existence, and 'this
means that such extraterrestrial beings would have to be regarded as
persons' (Tooley: 1976, 145).
Tooley's argument in support of the idea that ETIs may be regarded
as persons rests on precisely the same grounds as his justification of our
calling another human being a person. Its upshot, however, is rather
trivial: if some ETIs were very similar to humans - and if they were not
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deceptions - those ETIs would have to count as persons. The intriguing
question is under what conditions ETIs are properly considered to be
persons when we do not know the extent to which they are similar to us.
It seems to me that Tooley underestimates the practical difficulties. The
identity theorist is not able to look for corresponding states of the
'brains' of the ETIs. The explanatory power of a mind (according to
Tooley, reason for a dualist to consider ETIs as persons) is not clear if
we know almost nothing about the physiology of an ΕΤΙ. Of Toole/s
three philosophies of mind only the behaviourists' approach seems
feasible.
Tooley discusses the problem of whether ETIs are persons, because he
wishes to answer the moral question of how we ought to treat them.
However, as will be explained in section 3, one does not need to know
whether they are persons to have reasons to treat ETIs as persons.
According to R. Puccetti, in his Persons. A study of Possible Moral
Agents in the Universe, moral relations 'are possible only between
persons, and ... any entity with which one can conceive having moral
relations would be a person' (Puccetti: 1968, 26). Puccetti applies the
concept to artifacts, ETIs, and God. According to him, belief in the
existence of ETIs conflicts with belief in God. This theological claim will
be discussed below. First I want to focus on morality.
For evolutionary reasons 'the differences [between ETIs and humans]
will be relatively negligible' (Pucetti: 1968, 89). Puccetti bases this on
examples of convergent evolution on Earth. He points out that some
scientists refer to ETIs as 'humanoids'. He sees this as an example of
parochialism. A concept at a higher level, i.e., 'person', is already
available, for
although human beings are persons, not all persons need to be human. To
qualify as a person an entity must, as I said, be capable of both these things:
the assimilation of a conceptual scheme and the experience of sensations,
emotional states, etc. Which is to say that persons are always potential 'moral
agents' (Pucetti: 1968,99).
Convergent evolution assures him that
despite secondary biological differences they would certainly qualify for person-
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status, since they would be both capable of assimilating a conceptual scheme
and the sort of entity to which one can quite reasonably ascribe feelings
(Pucetti: 1968,106).
Puccetti then goes on to discuss moral relations within a postulated
community of ETIs and possible moral relations between ourselves and
ETIs. The truisms of H.LA. Hart (1961) (vulnerability, equality in
strength etc.) are
applicable to extraterrestrial communities as well. For we have seen how the
principle of convergent evolution assures a considerable uniformity between our-
selves and extraterrestrials ... For this reason I think that if we ever establish
communications with extraterrestrial societies we shall find their moral concepts
and legal structures recognizably familiar, at least in these more fundamental
respects (Hart: 1961,109f).
The question of moral relations between ourselves and ETIs is a more
complex one. If we were to come into direct physical contact with ETI's,
which Puccetti justly considers extremely unlikely, this might lead to
colonization and either destruction (no established moral relation) or
living together, especially if the planet of one of the societies has
become uninhabitable. In the latter case there would be moral relations.
It would be different if contact were made by radio. Even then there are
some moral aspects to the relation. It is already a moral decision to send
valuable information, for it is an example of supererogatory moral
behaviour to promote the well-being of the receiving civilization. And
both communities may arouse certain feelings in each other, for example
feelings of comfort. (If one reports the occurrence of a catastrophe the
reaction of the other can make a difference.)
So far R.Puccetti. I agree with most of the issues mentioned above.
But I am less confident that convergence in the evolution of different
species on Earth can be extrapolated to convergence between species on
different planets. Though there is room for analogical reasoning here, I
maintain that we should be more careful in our consideration of things
that may reasonably be supposed to be quite different.
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2.3 ETIs as social persons?
Hubbeling mentions relations with other individuals, with a collectivity
and with God as the fourth group of criteria constituting personhood. If
signals were sent out by a group of cooperating individuals, there should
be at least some practical forms of cooperation; but this neither implies
personal ('I-Thou') relations within that group, nor a wish on its part to
enter into an I-thou relation with another culture. There could be other
reasons for sending messages, like cosmic expansion or curiosity.
Columbus did not embark on his journey in order to establish personal
relationships with people of other cultures. Ascription of personhood in
the social sense, then, is not defensible on the basis of the mere fact
that messages have been received.
JJ. Oosten's contribution to this volume adopts a different approach
to the concept of person by placing it squarely within a social context.
He maintains that in a discussion on the meaning of the concept of per-
son, one should not neglect the ideological function of the concept in
our society. He criticizes Hubbeling's position as representing the latter's
own Western philosophical tradition and thus as not being helpful in
acquiring an understanding of other cultures.
Oosten's critical remarks apply to this paper as well, because it has
been written within the Western, scientific tradition. I am not concerned
with the question whether ETIs have a concept like 'person', but rather
with the question whether our concept can be applied to ETI's, as well as
with the difficulties that might arise in this connection. In Oosten's
approach the only point of discussion seems to be the social function of
the concept of person within a particular culture. Obviously in that sense
it cannot be applied to ETIs, given the (lack of) knowledge we have of
them now, as well as the (lack of) knowledge we will have of them in
the near future.
2.4 ETIs and religion
In my opinion there is no way of knowing whether ETIs have rela-
tions with God. We simply cannot tell whether they are persons in the
sense of the last of Hubbeling's characteristics as long as we do not
have messages that are intelligible to us. In a few publications attention
has been paid to the theological implications of the existence of ETIs and
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extraterrestrial persons in particular. These publications mainly deal with
the place and worth of man in the universe, the relation between God
and mankind and the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. Since it is directly
related to the concept of person, I shall discuss the position taken by R.
Puccetti who claims that:'a correct analysis of the person-concept combi-
ned with the not unreasonable belief in extraterrestrial natural persons
actually undermines the belief in God'. (Puccetti: 1968, 143).
As a factual statement this is not true. There are some believers who do
think that the uniqueness of mankind is essential, but there are others
who are delighted by the idea that the universe is full of images of God,
expressing His fullness and love. Puccetti, however, is referring to the
fact that it undermines the belief in God if one reasons correctly. His
main argument (besides the fact that ETIs are not mentioned in the
Bible and the 'scandal of particularity") is related to the person of Christ.
The unity of the person of Christ is incompatible with an incarnation on
every inhabited planet. Puccetti (1969, 139) estimates that 'there would be
in the order of 680,000,000 to 3,400,000,000 incarnations occurring
simultaneously from now to the extinction of life on all such stars'.
This contradicts the oneness of the Son of God, 'for two corporeal
persons are not one' (ibid, 140).
Puccetti asks a serious question concerning Christology and the
doctrine of the Trinity. However, I think he claims too much in presu-
ming that this is a question that cannot be answered within the
framework of Christianity. Some forms of Christianity cannot incorporate
it, but as a whole Christianity is quite flexible. Apart from changing the
dogma of the Trinity or reducing Christ to the expression of God's love
for us, one could perform the same kind of arithmetical tricks as Puccetti
does. Two is not the same as one. But the second person of the Trinity
is traditionally conceived of as an infinite being. And 'infinite+1' equals
'infinite+2'! If the incarnation is the expression of God in a finite being,
that finite being does not exhaust the Christ. This may seem somewhat
scholastic, but it shows that Puccetti's argument is not conclusive.
Puccetti's argument seems to imply that his concept of person is not
applicable to God and Christ. He suggests the conclusion that they do not
exist. However, it is an old idea in theology that our concepts apply only
analogically to God. So if a certain concept of person does not work,
why not abandon or reformulate it? E. McMullin (1980,88) perceived 'an
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odd, ungenerous fundamentalism at work here, a refusal to allow for the
expansion of doctrine, that is after all characteristic of both science and
theology". I think that Puccetti's argument does not by implication
undermine the belief in God. However, it has a psychological aspect: the
belief in ETIs compensates for a belief which Puccetti has already
discarded:
But at least it could lay to rest the provincial humanist dogma that if we
abandon belief in the Divine we have nothing to fall back on but Man's values.
What we have to fall back on are the values, one may reasonably hold, of a
potentially universal community of persons from which we are detached by the
accidental dispersion of matter in the cosmos. That is a pallid comfort, yet a
comfort of a kind (Pucetti: 1968,118).
3. When should we call them persons?
By way of conclusion I would like to defend the thesis that in
different contexts there are different reasons for ascribing personhood to
ETIs.
If extraterrestrials are considered in a moral or legal discourse, I
think that it is reasonable to talk about persons. In the rare cases of
moral discourse related to extraterrestrials it is morally better to treat
them, at least prima facie, the way we would like to be treated ourselves.
Reciprocity seems in this case to be the only argument, and not whether
they 'are' persons. If, as in some science-fiction, we were to find a
spaceship with frozen ETIs, we would be obliged to treat them the way
we are expected to treat humans.
In religious discourse concerning the uniqueness of humanity, God's
relation to us and to other creatures, the same reciprocity holds. We
should treat them as persons and we should modify our opinions, if
necessary, about the relation between God and mankind so that they can
incorporate these ETIs as well. One could of course deny this equality in
relation to God, and classify them as animals, but I consider that to be
the sin of hubris. One could also rank ETIs among the angels, but that
might prove to be false if we were to become better acquainted with
them.
In scientific or general philosophical discourse, which is what the
main part of this paper consists of, there is no reason to take a firm
Extraterrestrial Persons 391
stand. I expect that ETIs, if we were to learn something about them in
the next millennium, would in some respects fit our concepts of person,
but there is no need to go ahead of it. The question whether they are
'real persons' presumes a fixed, platonic, concept of person. Let us wait
and see.
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